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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of carbon trading schemes 
when contrasted with carbon taxes in reducing environmental externalities. An 
experimental survey explored individual’s behavioural response to a personal carbon 
trading (PCT) scheme, or a carbon tax (CT), both affecting personal transport and 
domestic energy choices. Responses were two stage, firstly whether to change 
behaviour or not, and secondly how much to change. Results from the first stage 
indicate that those on high incomes and car users were less likely to change their 
behaviour, whilst those who had already changed their behaviour due to concern 
about climate change, lived in larger households or faced the CT were more likely to 
change. The second stage revealed fewer significant effects, the impact of already 
changing behaviour persisted and this case those who faced PCT were likely to make 
greater changes. Both schemes appear to be capable of reducing individual carbon 
consumption, however, the evidence on effectiveness of a PCT relative to a simpler 
CT is mixed and insufficient to make a strong case for such a complex scheme over a 
more straightforward tax.      
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Personal Carbon Trading (PCT) schemes have been identified as potential tools to 
achieve reductions in carbon emissions generated by human behaviour as they directly 
target individual energy and fuel consumption. PCT schemes are market-based instruments 
for the control of pollution. They affect the pricing system in order to generate a 
behavioural switch towards less energy intensive consumption, and hence reduce the level 
of carbon emissions.   
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the potential behavioural impact in terms of 
personal transport and domestic energy usage of a PCT scheme, using a carbon tax (CT) 
levied on personal consumption as a comparator. We aim to answer the following research 
questions:  
 
 To what degree are these schemes likely to induce behavioural change in terms of 
personal transport and domestic energy usage?  
 What are the key elements that influence behavioural response?  
 Are there any differences in response between a PCT and CT when the monetary 
incentive is equivalent? 
 
The research reported here addresses these questions through the development and 
application of an experimental survey instrument that simulates the effect of the schemes 
on a sample of individuals in accordance with their current carbon consumption. The data 
obtained enables analysis of a range of potential determinants of behavioural change, 
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including socio-economic and attitudinal information, and allows identification of the 
carbon saving behaviours most likely to be adopted. This study adds to the very limited 
literature on behavioural response to PCT schemes through the development and 
application of an experimental survey, which grounds responses in current behaviours and 
covers a wide range of contextual and behavioural variables.  This is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first economic study of this type.  
 
This paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly reviews the theory and 
literature.  Section 3 presents the conceptual framework and methodology. Section 4 
describes the survey and sample characteristics. Results are presented in section 5, while 
Section 6 discusses and concludes.  
 
 2. Theory and review of the literature 
 
Tradable permit schemes find their theoretical roots in the theory of property rights 
developed by Coase (1960) and subsequently by Dales (1968). These systems set a precise 
limit to emissions and allow marginal abatement costs to vary across sources. Various types 
of upstream applications involving the issue and exchange of permits among economic 
organisations, countries, and energy and fuel producers have been considered and used to 
control different types of pollution (Benz and Truck 2009; Golombeck and Hoel 2008; 
Pezzey 2003). Conversely, emission taxes find their theoretical roots in the work of Pigou, 
which explained the necessity of fixing a tax at the value of the environmental externality 
in order to attain both the optimal level of production and reduced pollution (Pezzey 2003). 
Carbon taxes generally take the form of excise taxes on the carbon content of fossil fuels 
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and have been proposed and implemented over the years in a number of countries (Aldy et 
al. 2008; Brannlund and Nordstrom 2004). 
 
Trading schemes have mostly been applied at the upstream level, while carbon taxes 
concentrating on households and individual consumption are applied in Finland and 
Denmark (Wier et al. 2005) for example, and in other countries as fuel and energy taxes. 
Recently attention has been given to the greater involvement of individuals as a way to 
increase the efficiency of trading schemes and reallocate property rights over the 
environment. In some proposals, citizens (or environmental organisations) compete with 
firms in the distribution of allowances with the purpose of retiring permits to pollute from 
the market (Ahlheim and Schneider 2002; Israel 2007; Malueg and Yates 2006; Rousse 
2008). Such systems, however, despite increasing citizens’ involvement in the trading of 
permits, do not directly target individual energy usage.   
 
In the late 1990’s Fleming (1997, p. 140) proposed a tradable quota system to 
provide “a national market for a progressively reduced quantity of carbon units”  covering 
individuals and organisations. This inspired a number of authors to propose a variety of 
schemes based on this principle including: Personal Carbon Trading (PCT), Personal 
Carbon Allowances (PCAs),Tradable Energy Quotas (TEQs), Domestic Transferable 
Permits and Tradable Credit Schemes (Fawcett 2010; Harwatt et al. 2011; Hobbs et al. 
2010; Parag et al. 2011; Raux 2004; Yang and Wang 2011). These schemes generally 
consider a free equal per capita allocation of emissions rights. These rights are then used 
when purchasing fuel or electricity. Individuals consuming over the allocated amount need 
to purchase additional rights from those consuming less. Various forms exist with respect, 
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for example, to whether individuals can purchase additional rights directly from fuel and 
energy producers, whether households with children are allocated extra rights, and what 
sort of emissions are included (for example some schemes cover transport emissions only) 
(Starkey 2012a)1. The PCT design tested in this paper is outlined in detail in section 4. 
 
A number of arguments have been put forward for PCT. We focus here on two key 
arguments related to the potential of PCT to generate behavioural change. Firstly it is 
suggested that from an economic efficiency point of view, individual energy consumption 
reduction appears to be achievable more efficiently downstream, as the market mechanisms 
allow for the equalisation of the marginal abatement costs for the participants and for a 
higher degree of flexibility in the switch towards less polluting behaviour (Connor et al. 
2008; Joskow et al. 1998). However, PCT schemes are more complex and expensive 
instruments than taxes, because of the involvement of trading and the necessary transaction 
costs, and this could potentially reduce behavioural impact and the overall acceptability of 
such schemes (Bristow et al. 2010).  
Secondly, in psychological terms, these schemes are thought to be capable of 
increasing individual ‘engagement’ with emission reduction as they are felt as ‘immediate’ 
and a more direct way to ‘exercise responsibility’ (Fleming 1997; Starkey and Anderson 
2005). Additionally they  provide  a vehicle for  ‘feedback’ and ‘goal setting’ to 
individuals, the role of which is discussed by Abrahamse et al. (2007), as they transform 
carbon into a  visible resource that can be conserved, budgeted and managed (Capstick and 
Lewis 2010). A PCT system may also be perceived as giving individuals more choices than 
                                                 
1 These schemes and their characteristics are extensively discussed in two recent papers by Starkey (2012a; 
b). 
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a tax as permits can be destroyed (to stop others using them) or retained for future use 
(Wadud et al. 2008). Most of the points discussed above remain, however, theoretical, as at 
present no such scheme (at a large scale) is in force. Very few empirical studies  have 
explored the potential behavioural effect of PCT or similar schemes (Capstick and Lewis 
2010; Harwatt et al. 2011; Parag et al. 2011; Wallace 2009). These studies vary in terms of 
the sectors addressed, the range of behaviours (often limited) examined, in some cases price 
is not included, and current behaviours not always established.  This paper reports the 
results from the first economic study of potential response to PCT (and CT) and adds to 
existing knowledge by considering a relatively large range of behaviours from transport 
and domestic energy usage, precisely linking current consumption and potential 
behavioural change and varying price incentives. This enables us to test the hypothesis that 
a PCT would lead to greater emissions reductions than a CT with an equivalent price 
incentive. 
 
3. Conceptual framework and methodology 
 
This analysis focuses on emissions produced by domestic energy usage and personal 
transport, and therefore does not include emissions from the consumption of other goods or 
services. For simplicity we consider individual (rather than household) decisions.   
 
A simple static theoretical framework is now introduced. Let a consumer’s utility 
function prior to the introduction of the schemes be: 
 
),,( eyxuU                   (1) 
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Equation (1) shows that this consumer’s utility depends on two types of goods, 
polluting (x), and non-polluting (y) (where x and y are not perfect substitutes in accordance 
with the information in possession of the agent), and on environmental quality e. This 
function is continuous and strictly quasi-concave in x and y but not in e as it is assumed that 
individuals may be indifferent to environmental quality2. This is reasonable in the context 
of climate change where the degradation of environmental quality is not always directly felt 
by individuals (Tjernstrom and Tietenberg 2008). Therefore, we consider perceived rather 
than observable environmental quality and we do not formalise a precise relationship 
between consumption (and consequent emissions) and environmental degradation.    
   
The consumption of goods x and y depends on their respective prices and the budget 
constraint takes the usual form mypxp yx   where px and py are the prices of the goods x 
and y respectively, and m represents the consumer’s income. If a PCT or CT system comes 
into force, t is a levy applied to individual consumption exceeding an exogenously fixed 
value x (which represents the allocation and the rebate threshold for PCT and CT, 
respectively)3 so that sxx pxxtp  )( , where sxp  represents the new price of the polluting 
goods x, while the prices of the non-polluting goods are assumed to remain constant and are 
therefore normalised to 1. Then, the consumer’s consumption decision depends on the 
following utility maximisation problem:  
                                                 
2 In the model developed by Bento and Jacobsen (2007) for example, emissions directly reduce consumer 
utility, while in Kotchen (2009) consumption of private goods affects the public good environment and in this 
way reduces utility. Here, loss of environmental quality is analysed exclusively through consumers’ 
perception.  
3 The carbon tax system translates into a price increase for all the units of carbon consumed, including those 
units below the allocation. In a static framework we directly consider the effect of an equal per capita tax 
rebate and in practice the system only generates a price increase for consumption levels above the allocated 
amount.  
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So, according to equation 2) an above allocation consumer may decide to: 
1) continue with consumption of x at the level prior to the introduction of 
the CT-PCT (x) and pay the augmented price sxx pxxtp  )( . 
2) reduce consumption of x down to a level where x= x (or even beyond, to 
gain from trading or tax rebate), as below this level the levy is not applied, and pay  
the price px as before the application of the scheme.  
3) pay a portion of t(xi- x ) by partly reducing consumption of x, without 
attaining the level x .   
 
A below allocation consumer may decide to: 
1) continue with consumption of x at the level prior to the introduction of the 
CT-PCT (x) and obtain the benefit entitlement t( x - x) in terms of spare permits to 
sell or tax rebate.  
2) increase consumption towards (or beyond) the allocated amount x (the 
endowment received).  
3) further reduce consumption in order to increase the amount of benefit t( x - 
x). 
 
Clearly there is an array of choices at the disposal of both types of consumers which 
will depend on the utility maximisation problem above. This analysis first considers a 
discrete choice between reducing (alternative j) or not reducing (alternative i) the initial 
consumption of polluting goods x, given the amount of tax/permits. In a Random Utility 
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framework (McFadden 1974) this can be modelled as P(reduce) = P((Vj+εj)>( Vi+εi);  j ≠ 
i) where Vi and Vj are the consumers’ indirect utility functions for the two alternatives i and 
j, and ε is a stochastic term and, subsequently, a continuous choice (for those who have 
stated their intention to reduce) over the magnitude of reduction of consumption of x. The 
latter is considered as it is likely that above allocation consumers stating their intention to 
reduce can maximise their utility in an intermediate situation where they consume less than 
initially but still above the allocated amount4. Importantly, choice is assumed to depend on 
whether the consumer faces a PCT or CT scheme as well as on attitudinal and socio-
economic characteristics. The analysis allows for the identification of the determinants of 
choice as well as the amount of carbon consumption xi resulting from the application of the 
proposed schemes. We will also examine the new composition of the individual carbon 
consumption (in terms of personal transport and domestic energy usage) and the behaviours 
most likely to be adopted.   
  
The utility differential may also depend on the perceived change in environmental 
quality e. Consumers reaction to the schemes could simply be based on the value they place 
on consumption of x (and how much they are prepared to reduce it) if they do not believe 
that climate change is an issue. Free riding could occur, with individuals believing that their 
contribution to emission reduction would in any case be minimal. On the other hand, 
‘public good’ and ‘environmental concern’ effects (Johnson et al. 2006; Kahn 2007), as 
well as ‘warm glow’ and ‘pure altruism’ effects (Laury and Taylor 2008) could have the 
                                                 
4 In Equivalent Loss (EL) terms (Bateman et al. 2005), for above allocation consumers, this amount could 
therefore be interpreted as a measure of the value consumers attach to their current consumption of polluting 
(in terms of direct CO2 emission) goods and services which define their ‘carbon intensive’ lifestyle. 
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opposite effect. Importantly, increased information provided by the schemes could make 
certain polluting and non-polluting goods or services almost perfect substitutes, by 
highlighting ‘waste’, and it could then be the case that reduced consumption and 
substitution between x and y could generate the same level of utility.  
 
4. The schemes, sample and survey  
 
The PCT scheme used here, illustrated in Table 1 in the Appendix, was based on the UK 
Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (RSA) model 
(2007). The CT instrument was designed to achieve equality of the monetary incentives 
(excluding distributional impact) between the two schemes, in order to isolate reasons other 
than price signals for any differences in response.  
 
The UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) ‘Act on CO2’ 
carbon footprint calculator (Defra 2008), which considers emissions generated by energy 
and fuel consumption from home usage (heating, lighting and appliances), and for personal 
transport (including car use and aviation, but excluding land-based forms of public 
transport) was used to calculate individuals’ current carbon consumption. This calculator 
provided a user-friendly and effective tool to assess respondents’ current carbon 
consumption. The free allocation for PCT and the rebate threshold for CT was set at 4 
tonnes CO2 per annum. A tax rebate system rewarded individuals consuming less than the 
threshold, as does the sale of permits in the case of PCT. The free allocation was below the 
4.48 tonnes estimated (at the time of the survey) individual average for domestic and 
transport emissions in the UK (Defra 2008) and consequently allowed us to simulate a 
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scheme designed with the purpose of reducing the allocated amount of emissions per 
person.  Individuals were therefore divided in two main categories, those whose carbon 
footprint is below 4 tonnes CO2 (below allocation) and those above (above allocation).   
 
A computer assisted survey instrument was developed in order to collect the 
information necessary for this analysis and the data collection was carried out in May/June 
2008 in several locations in the South East of England5. The usable sample included 
responses from 189 individuals. These were almost evenly split between male (51%) and 
female (49%) and across different age bands, with an average household size of 2.6. 
Approximately half of the sample lived in rented accommodation or with their family, 
while the rest lived in their own property. 35% were in full time employment, while 15% 
were unemployed. The remaining respondents were in part-time employment, full and part-
time education or in retirement (about 10% for each category). 25% of the sample did not 
reveal information about their gross household income, 15% had an income below £10,000, 
21% between £10,000 and £20,000, 18% between £20,000 and £30,000, 12% from £30,000 
to £50,000 and 8% more than £50,000.  
 
The average carbon footprint was 5.56 tonnes of CO2, with around 60% of 
respondents above the free allowance of 4.0 tonnes. Domestic energy accounted for about 
65% of emissions, while the remaining emissions were transport generated (car usage and 
fly). However, about 25% of the sample had no transport emissions at all. 35% of 
respondents had no car, 46% one car and 19% more than one car. The average personal 
                                                 
5 Respondents were recruited on street in four locations in outer London and one in Essex. On average, 
respondents needed around 45/60 minutes to complete the questionnaire, and were given £10 as an incentive. 
A full version of the questionnaire is available upon request. 
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mileage per year for car users was 3,1206. The most common domestic energy saving 
actions already adopted by over 50% of the sample included turning off lights when leaving 
a room, using washing machines for full loads only, switching “stand-by” equipment off at 
the socket, and turning the thermostat down in winter. 25% said they had reduced their car 
usage and/or fuel consumption through eco-driving and 15% stated they had reduced their 
flying. The least common current actions were those involving the purchase and use of new 
energy generating technology such as solar panels, micro-wind turbine and ground-source 
heat pumps. 
 
Respondents first completed the carbon footprint calculator and a set of questions 
concerning their socioeconomic characteristics, current behaviour in terms of energy usage 
and transport, and attitudes towards climate change. All respondents were then given a 
simple explanation of how CT and PCT schemes may work, as well as a predefined list of 
transport and domestic energy carbon saving actions, see Tables A1 and A2 in the 
appendix. The list which also contained approximate monetary savings and payoff periods 
for energy saving and generating devices, was necessary to enable direct calculation of CO2 
savings, maintain consistency with the carbon footprint calculator, and avoid respondents 
suggesting actions outside the scope of the schemes. Carbon savings were indicative and 
calculated following Defra (2008) and Energy Saving Trust (EST 2008). The list and the 
subsequent questions enabled us to identify for each individual actions in which they were 
                                                 
6 Population (GLA 2009) and environment (EA 2010) statistics show that females in London in 2008 were 
slightly more numerous in London (50.5%) and average household size was 2.6 members. Unemployment 
rate was 7.2%, average income about £17,000. Car ownership distribution was as in our sample, while the 
average mileage was 3,801. In the same year, about 20% of London’s inhabitants’ carbon footprint was 
generated by transport.    
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already engaged and those that were simply not relevant (for example reducing car usage 
was not relevant for non-car owners).  
 
Respondents were then asked how they would respond to a PCT or a CT. Half of 
the sample faced the CT scheme, the remaining half the PCT scheme. The amount of 
permits they needed to buy (if above allocation) or could sell (if below) or the amount of 
tax they had to pay or would receive in rebate form were automatically calculated by 
multiplying the difference between their carbon footprint and the 4.0 tonnes allocation, and 
the price per tonne of CO2. Three price levels were equally distributed across the sample: 
£50, £100 and £250 per tonne CO2. The rates were generally higher than the central value 
placed on carbon in the non-traded sector by the UK Department of Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC) (2009) (set at £50 for 2008) but were used here (together with an 
allocation more than 10% below than the average emission level), because of the relatively 
low elasticity of demand with respect to energy and fuel price, especially in the short term 
(Boonekamp 2007; Goodwin et al. 2004; Graham and Glaister 2004), in order to provide a 
clear price incentive7. Respondents were asked, given that amount, to decide between two 
options: (1) to pay (or receive) the amount and continue with their current carbon 
consumption, or (2) to engage in carbon saving actions in order to reduce (increase) the 
amount they had to pay (receive)8. This question may be found in Table A3 in the 
appendix. 
                                                 
7 It is worth observing that a recent study produced evidence of higher price elasticities than previously 
thought for gas and electricity (Alberini and Filippini 2011), while another claims gasoline is more inelastic 
than previously thought (Havranek et al. 2012).    
8 Respondents were not given an “opt out” option to surrender all their permits and effectively purchase them 
from providers as they go, although this would probably have to be an option in any real world 
implementation, here it would have complicated the experiment. 
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Respondents who stated an intention to reduce their carbon footprint were then 
asked to indicate which carbon saving actions they would engage in. The computerised 
survey showed respondents only actions which were relevant to them and they were not 
already doing9. Respondents were then able to see the corresponding CO2 saving of each 
selected action and its impact on their initial carbon footprint, as well as the resulting 
monetary saving (in terms of permit/tax over a year)10.  
 
5. Empirical models and results  
 
5.1 Sample differences and variable definitions 
 
Before introducing the results of the econometric analysis of choice data we provide some 
summary information. First of all, as one of the objectives of our paper is to explore the 
PCT/CT differential in behavioural impact, it is useful to discuss any differences between 
the respondents who received PCT and those who received CT. We therefore need to assess 
whether differences in behaviour may be related to particular characteristics of the two sub-
samples rather than a genuinely differential response to the two schemes. A comparison of 
the mean for a number of sample characteristics revealed that the two sub-samples 
significantly differed for two characteristics only. These were the household size (which 
was higher for respondents who received PCT, p=0.04) and the perceived capacity to save 
                                                 
9 Exceptions to this were measures already engaged in but where more could be done, for example, reducing 
car use. 
10 Please note that investment and payoff period figures for energy saving devices were given to respondents 
for information only. In our simple theoretical approach their impact on disposable income is not considered, 
and consequently the calculated tax/permit saving figures were also not affected.  
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carbon from domestic energy usage (also higher for respondents who received PCT,  
p=0.00). All other characteristics including initial carbon footprint and proportion of below 
and above allocation respondents were not significantly different. However, the random 
distribution of carbon price levels across the sample also generated a significant difference 
with respondents who received CT facing a lower price per tonne, and, consequently a 
lower total amount of cost/benefit (p=0.08 and p=0.05, respectively). These differences 
were tested in the empirical analysis. 
 
Table 1 lists the variables considered to be potential determinants of respondents’ 
choices and used in this analysis. These include price levels, respondents’ current transport 
usage, home tenure, environmental attitudes, demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics and perceived abatement costs. Two price variables were considered, the 
cost (or benefit) per unit tonne of CO2 (PriceU), and the total cost (PriceT), price per tonne 
multiplied by difference between respondents’ initial footprint and free allocation). Both 
were hypothesised to have an effect on respondents’ decisions. Differences between the 
respondents who faced CT and those who face PCT were captured by the variable 
TAXPCT. 
[TABLE 1 GOES HERE] 
5.2 Discrete choice – Would you reduce? 
 
The majority of respondents, 80% in the case of CT and 72% in the case of PCT, stated an 
intention to reduce their carbon footprint given the conditions of the two schemes. As 
indicated in section 3 we are considering a discrete response of the form P(reduce) = 
P((Vj+εj)>( Vi+εi);  j ≠ i). If we consider Vj=βXj, where  is a vector of parameters, we can 
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estimate the probability of choosing to reduce carbon consumption using the binary logit 
probability function:   
 
)'exp(1
)'exp(
j
j
j X
X
P 

          (3) 
 
An interaction term was specified between price (both total and per unit) and 
above/below allocation to distinguish between money gains and losses. Table 2 shows the 
binary logit models estimated, Model 1 uses PriceT and Model 2 PriceU. 
 
[TABLE 2 GOES HERE] 
 
Table 2 shows that the models are broadly similar, in terms of general performance, 
the model with marginal rather than total cost/benefit performs better as it has a higher 
McFadden R2. Here we discuss those variables found to have a significant influence on 
response. Respondents living in larger households, not using a car and in employment were 
more likely to reduce their carbon footprint given the conditions of the schemes as did 
those who had already made changes to their transport and domestic energy choices (most 
strongly where climate change is a reason for changing), had a lower perceived importance 
of time constraints (to engage in carbon saving actions) and, surprisingly, those with higher 
perceived cost barriers to carbon saving behaviour. Additionally in Model 2 those whose 
footprint was higher than expected were more likely to change. In Model 1 those aged 30 to 
40 were less likely to change than those aged over 60, but this is only significant at 90% 
and otherwise age was not an influential variable on response. These findings are largely 
intuitive. Though the household size effect was not anticipated, it might be expected that 
larger households on average consume more and therefore have greater available 
opportunity to reduce. Finally, those on higher incomes were less likely to change in 
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response to the price offered, and those who were offered at CT were more likely to change 
their behaviour than those offered the PCT. 
 
Price (both in its marginal and total form, with the former having a more significant 
impact) had a significant effect. In order to understand whether this effect was different 
depending on whether the respondents were above or below allocation, further analysis was 
carried out on the interaction term employing a graphical technique recently proposed by 
Greene (2010). This allows for the analysis of interactions in single index logit models 
overcoming the issues linked to the interpretation of the interaction coefficient (and the 
corresponding partial effect) first highlighted by Ai and Norton (2003).   
 
Firstly, it is necessary to calculate the partial effect of the interaction terms. For the 
case of a logit model where one continuous variable and a dummy are interacted, the partial 
effect of the interaction term is the discrete difference (with respect to x2) of the single 
derivative (with respect to x1) (Ai and Norton 2003; Norton et al. 2004): 
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          (4) 
 
In Equation 4), where β are the estimated parameters, F is the standard logit 
cumulative distribution function, x1 and x2 the two interacting variables, and X the 
remaining covariates (at their means). Greene (2010), unlike Ai and Norton (2003), does 
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not perform a test of statistical significance over the partial effect but uses it to graphically 
analyse the interaction effect as in the following figure11: 
[FIGURE 1 GOES HERE] 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the difference in terms of reaction to total price between the two 
classes of respondents. Partial effects (Y axis) are plotted against PriceT (X axis). The 
distance between the two lines can be interpreted as the interaction effect. Total price has a 
higher impact on the choice outcome for above allocation respondents (the dotted line), 
indicating that monetary losses are more important than gains in determining the choice 
outcome. The importance of losses in determining the probability to reduce increases with 
total price up to a value of about £1,500 per year, to become fairly steady thereafter. For 
below allocation respondents, intuitively, the effect of total gain is reversed and higher 
amounts have a diminishing effect on the choice outcome, as at a higher price of carbon 
these respondents will receive more before they make any changes12. 
 
[FIGURE 2 GOES HERE] 
 
Figure 2 shows that the effect of PriceU is also higher for above allocation 
respondents, especially at higher prices per unit. The effect of price per unit of CO2 has an 
upward impact on the choice outcome for above allocation respondents, who are therefore 
                                                 
11 The analysis was carried out using LIMDEP 9.0. Communication with William Greene was instrumental in 
the comprehension and preparation of the relevant codes.  
12 Please note that the maximum amount of total gain for below allocation respondents was £842 pounds, 
while the corresponding maximum total cost for above allocation respondents was £2610. The ranges are 
obviously different between the two classes of respondents as carbon footprint figures lies in the range [0 - 
∞], with 4 being the allocation. The plot in Figure 2 projects therefore the partial effect for higher figures for 
below allocation respondents in order to compare the two classes of respondents at all values.   
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more likely to reduce their carbon consumption when the price per Tonne is higher. A 
similar but weaker trend is observed for below allocation respondents.  
 
The models presented earlier in Table 2 showed that respondents facing a CT were 
more likely to state their willingness to reduce. Here we examine whether this is 
determined by differences in the price levels or by a genuinely different reaction the two 
schemes. Models considering the interaction of CT/PCT with PriceT or U were estimated, 
and the partial effect of the interaction terms was calculated as in Equation 4). Figure 3 
graphically illustrates the case of PriceT.  
 
[FIGURE 3 GOES HERE] 
 
Figure 3 shows that the probability to reduce emissions increases with price under 
both schemes. The higher partial effect for CT indicates that at the same price levels 
respondents who received CT were indeed more likely to reduce. This differential 
diminishes as total cost (gain) increases. A similar result is also obtained when unit rather 
than total price per tonne of CO2 are considered as shown below in Figure 413.  
 
[FIGURE 4 GOES HERE] 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 There were two other significant differences between the sub-samples, one of these perceived ability to 
save carbon at home was not significant in the models and therefore not pursued further. Household size was 
higher for those receiving PCT therefore an interaction between Household size and TAXPCT was explored 
using the same graphical method. This showed that the effect of tax on the choice outcome was not dependent 
on household size as the partial effect for CT was higher than PCT at all household sizes. 
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5.3 Continuous choice – If yes, how much would you reduce?  
 
Table 3 shows average savings for those who would change their behaviour of 13.9% for 
CT and 18.6% for PCT. Across the whole sample (including those who do not change) 
savings are 10.9% (CT) and 13.3% (PCT). End of experiment carbon footprint figures were 
slightly above 5 tonnes for CT respondents and 4.75 tonnes for PCT respondents. 
Generally, domestic energy savings were higher than in transport (the two figures are 
significantly different, p=0.01).  
[TABLE 3 GOES HERE] 
 
 
Respondents were given the opportunity to select actions to reduce their footprint 
and the amount of tax or permits to buy (or increase permits to sell). Overall, about two 
thirds of car users said they would reduce their annual mileage (by about 1,100 miles, on 
average) and adopt a more fuel efficient driving style14. Conversely, there was a resistance 
to reducing the number of flights, especially long haul international ones, while some 
respondents did manifest a willingness to substitute flights with trains for domestic trips. In 
terms of domestic energy usage, setting the thermostat at a lower temperature in winter and 
switching appliances off at the socket to avoid stand-by were the most popular energy 
saving actions at home, with more than half of the respondents choosing these actions to 
reduce their footprint. The least popular actions were those involving the purchase and 
installation of energy saving devices, in particular solar panel and micro wind turbines. 
                                                 
14 Supplementary questions (with no consequences on carbon and payments levels) asked respondents to 
indicate the way they intended to reduce their car usage and fuel consumption, and the most popular actions 
were: cycling and walking more, increasing usage of public transport, driving with a smoother style, 
improving car maintenance and, perhaps surprisingly, reducing speed on motorways.   
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Among these, switching to a more efficient boiler (condensing) was the most popular 
(about 40%).  
 
Analysis includes only those respondents who stated the intention to reduce their 
carbon footprint, and who were therefore shown the list of carbon saving actions (see 
Section 4 and Table A2 in the Appendix for details). The dependent variable here was the 
level of CO2 saving expressed as a proportion of the respondents’ initial carbon footprint. 
Results in Table 4 below were obtained with Generalised Least Squares (GLS). A normal 
linear model was employed, despite the proportional nature of the dependent variable, for 
simplicity and to allow for a more straightforward exploration of interaction effects. Data 
were also analysed employing the more appropriate generalised linear (quasi-likelihood 
regression) model (Papke and Wooldridge 1996) and the results did not substantially differ. 
[TABLE 4 GOES HERE] 
 
 
The model in Table 4 shows a limited number of coefficients that significantly 
influence the magnitude of savings, and this is also reflected in the relatively low R2. The 
small size of this sample may have played a role in determining this.  The significant 
coefficients show that respondents in education, those with the highest perceived ability to 
save from domestic energy usage, and those who had already made changes to their 
consumption, motivated by environment concerns, were those who saved most with respect 
to their initial carbon footprint, all intuitively logical effects. The same applied to 
respondents who live in their own property, in comparison with those who rent. The latter 
was expected as home owners have greater opportunities than tenants to adopt carbon 
saving behaviour and, especially, technology at domestic level. However, surprisingly, 
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carbon savings were also higher for respondents who thought their carbon footprint was 
lower than expected and, unlike the case of whether to change or not, for respondents living 
in smaller households.  
  
Table 4 also reports the interaction between the monetary variable and the condition 
of below/above allocation. The estimate for Price_T shows that the total cost (gain) is not 
significant for above allocation respondents. In order to detect the effect on below 
allocation respondents a further test of significance was carried out on the hypothesis of the 
sum of the two coefficients βPrice_T+ βPrice_T x Blwabv being equal to zero (see for 
example De Mel et al. 2009). This test (p=0.038) revealed that, in contrast to the previous 
case, total gain had an effect on below allocation respondents, with these respondents 
saving more when the total gain was higher.  
 
Marginal prices had an impact on the initial decision of whether to reduce or not, 
but did not significantly affect the magnitude of CO2 savings. The lack of significance of 
the marginal monetary variables, albeit surprising, may suggest that respondents did not 
simply tick actions in order to decrease (increase) their monetary sacrifice (benefit), but 
carefully considered what was feasible according to their personal situation and perceived 
ability to engage in carbon saving actions. This argument is supported by the finding that 
14 respondents who chose to reduce did not select any of the carbon saving options shown 
to them. Most of these respondents commented that although they wanted to reduce their 
carbon emissions the actions shown to them were not feasible for various reasons. This 
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suggests that the respondents were fully engaged with the survey and making realistic 
decisions.  
 
Finally, in both variants of the model the TAX/PCT variable is significant showing 
that the difference in saving figures between the two schemes highlighted in Table 3, with 
respondents facing a PCT saving more than those facing CT, is statistically significant. This 
variable was again interacted with those variables whose means were significantly different 
between the two sub-samples. These were total cost (gain), household size, perceived 
ability to save from transport, and perceived cost barriers. All of these but the last one were 
higher for respondents who received PCT. The results indicate that differences between 
saving figures for CT and PCT were not a consequence of the differences between the two 
sub-samples as the corresponding interaction effects were not significant. 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
This discussion relates the findings to the research questions raised in the introduction.  
The first question related to the extent of any behavioural change induced by the 
PCT and CT. We find that for the schemes presented here reported CO2 savings were for 
the overall sample around 10.9% for CT and 13.3% for PCT, respectively, with figures up 
to 18.6% for those who change their behaviour. These results are generally in line with 
ranges reported elsewhere in response to hypothetical measures(Brannlund and Nordstrom 
2004; Lundin 2001; Parag et al. 2011; Tight et al. 2007), suggesting perhaps that there is a 
limit at around 20% for short-term reductions in carbon consumption.  
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In terms of specific carbon saving actions our findings show that respondents 
perceive saving energy from home easier than from personal transport. This was confirmed 
by our further analysis as savings made in domestic energy usage were significantly higher 
than in transport. Respondents showed willingness to reduce car usage and adopt a more 
fuel efficient driving style. However, a resistance to reduce the number of flights 
(especially long-haul) was observed. In common with other examples in the literature 
(Dresner and Ekins 2006; Poortinga et al. 2003; Scarpa and Willis 2010) a certain 
scepticism was observed for unfamiliar domestic energy technologies (in particular 
electricity generating devices like micro-wind turbine, solar panels, and ground source 
heat-pumps) requiring a considerable initial investment and uncertain pay-off period. 
Improved home insulation appeared to be more acceptable, also in line with the findings of 
other recent studies (Banfi et al. 2008) as well as the purchase of condensing boilers. In 
general, the most popular energy saving actions were those requiring only minor 
adjustments to comfort and/or behaviour not requiring a considerable reduction in comfort 
and deep behavioural change. A significant effort in terms of information over the benefits 
of the most recent systems, and provision of grants to help initial investments, may 
therefore be required to increase their acceptability and usage.  
 
The second research question sought to determine the key elements that influence 
behavioural response. Price per unit is a key determinant of the initial choice of whether to 
change behaviour or not and has a greater effect for those who would pay than those who 
would gain. Apart from the dichotomy loss/gain already widely documented in the 
literature, there may be an issue of trust for such novel schemes where respondents do not 
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believe that a permit or tax scheme will actually deliver the monetary gain specified and 
therefore their choices are based on other factors. However, total gain was significant for 
below allocation respondents when analysing the magnitude of change, while marginal cost 
and gain were not. The relatively weak influence of price on the level of reduction may be 
because these decisions, in such an experimental setting, were largely affected by 
considerations of feasibility and other constraints affecting respondents perceived 
abatement costs. Discussion with respondents during the survey revealed that a number of 
them were not previously aware of the potential saving (both in financial and emissions 
terms) behind certain behavioural changes. Increased information, independent from price 
effects, may therefore have played a role here (as would be the case in a real world 
implementation). 
 
The analysis of the decision to reduce or not to reduce revealed a number of other 
influential variables. An income effect is detected indicating a greater likelihood of 
changing behaviour for the lowest income band with respect to the highest. The literature 
generally reports that carbon footprint increases with income (Druckman and Jackson 
2009). Our results suggest that the most affluent people are also less willing to change their 
behaviour. Other socio-economic characteristics have a positive effect: not using a car, 
being in employment and household size. Additionally those who reported they had already 
made changes to reduce energy use were more likely to change their behaviour here. This 
effect is particularly strong, as expected, for those who had made changes explicitly to 
reduce their carbon emissions. Those who perceived their carbon footprint was higher than 
expected, who perceived lower time barriers to change and higher cost barriers were also 
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more likely to change. While the positive effect on those with a higher carbon footprint 
than expected confirms the potential of the schemes to increase visibility of current 
consumption, it is possible that for the latter respondents the increased price was enough to 
counterbalance their price sensitivity to perceived costs to adopt less carbon intensive 
behaviour.   
 
The regression model looking at reduction levels had a relatively poor fit and 
relatively few significant variables. However, those in education and who perceive it to be 
easy to make energy savings in the home, saved more. The same applied those who had 
already made changes for reasons relating to climate change. Expectedly, those who rent 
saved less than home owners. Differences between the results from the analysis of the two 
questions, in particular the different effect of price, may have been due to different framing 
effects. In the first one respondents were simply asked to state the intention to reduce or not 
given a payment linked to their current carbon footprint. In the second one, respondents 
were asked to precisely state the way they intend to reduce by selecting carbon saving 
actions among a pre-defined list. 
 
Finally, the evidence is mixed on whether change in domestic energy and personal 
transport choices may differ between a CT and PCT schemes. The fact of facing a CT 
scheme appeared to be a determinant of the stated intention to reduce. However, when 
specific carbon saving actions were considered, PCT generated higher levels of saving for 
those who changed their behaviour. While in this experimental setting the visibility of 
carbon consumption was the same across the two schemes (i.e the way carbon footprint was 
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calculated and saving figures presented), the capacity of PCT to better link money and 
carbon, as observed in the introduction, may have played a role here, although this was not 
further supported by the significance of the marginal monetary variable. A stronger 
individual ‘engagement’ with emission reduction, a sense of immediacy, as well as the 
perception of PCT being a more direct way to ‘exercise responsibility’ may have influenced 
the response.    
 
This study is a first step in assessing the way individual consumers could react to 
PCT schemes and the consequent potential levels of carbon saving. An experimental survey 
instrument, considering a relatively large number of possible behavioural changes, was 
necessary to analyse such a novel and untested scheme. A precise link between simulated 
scheme and respondents’ current carbon consumption and situation was set up in order to 
reduce the hypothetical bias and results have certainly shown this was the case. The 
analysis has provided some interesting and useful insights into people’s preferences and 
possible reaction to the scheme.  Consideration of the potential cost of the application of 
the two schemes and whether the achievable CO2 emissions savings would represent an 
efficient use of resources was beyond the scope of this study. There remain other 
unanswered questions on the way consumers would effectively react to these schemes if in 
place, in particular their approach to trading permits, and further work on PCT schemes 
should aim to consider a dynamic rather than static setting and effectively simulate the 
functioning of the scheme (i.e. trading between agents) over a larger sample of individuals.   
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Description of the two schemes as they appeared to our study participants 
INTRODUCTION TO CARBON TAX 
This would be a tax on all purchases of energy that contribute to climate change. This would include: 
 Gas 
 Electricity 
 Petrol / diesel 
 Heating oil, coal or wood. 
This would increase the cost of all energy forms that contain carbon. 
This higher price would reflect the cost to the environment and would make us think about: 
 Conserving energy 
 Changing what we do - installing or buying solar or wind power, using public transport instead of 
driving 
Such a tax would generate money for the Government. This money could be used for a range of purposes: 
 Reducing other taxes, such as income tax 
 Investing in energy saving technologies or options, such as public transport or renewable energy. 
 Measures to help individuals to change their behaviour or reduce consumption, home insulation 
grants, public transport etc. 
 Give some money back to individuals directly. 
 
TO SUM UP: 
Everyone pays the same rate of tax regardless of income - in the same way as current purchase taxes. 
The design could include lump sum payments, cuts in other taxes or expenditure on carbon reduction 
measures. 
In this example we want you to consider that all carbon is taxed and the Government gives a tax refund up 
to the average carbon consumption. This means that only above average consumers pay more. 
 
INTRODUCTION TO PERSONAL CARBON TRADING 
The purchase and use of energy that contributes to climate change, gas, electricity, petrol /diesel, coal / oil / 
wood would require you to provide carbon permits for that amount of energy. 
We are asking you to consider only your personal travel including commuting to a place of work but not 
business travel. Businesses would be subject to a similar scheme to encourage the reduction of emissions. 
 
Allowance 
All adults would be given an equal and free allowance of permits. Initially, in the first year this would be 
based on average carbon consumption. After that the allowance would gradually reduce to encourage 
reductions in carbon use. 
 
Functioning 
Every time you buy petrol /diesel or pay a gas or electricity bill the relevant number of permits would be 
deducted from your account. 
If you do not have enough permits for a purchase you will need to buy additional ones 
If you do not use all of your permit allowance you can sell them for money. 
The principle is that people who need extra permits may buy them from people who have some in excess, 
and viceversa. 
The aim would be to reduce emissions of carbon. A PCT (Personal Carbon Trading) would encourage 
people to do this to avoid having to buy permits or to allow them to sell spare permits. 
We are now going to describe how a scheme might work and ask you about your response to it. 
Adults would receive an equal allowance of 4.0 tonnes of CO2. 
Those with children would receive an additional, smaller allowance for each child under 18. 
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Table A2. Carbon Saving Actions 
Carbon Saving Actions 
Information on savings and costs 
CO2 
(Tonnes) 
Purchase cost 
(£) + payback 
Approximate 
Saving per 
year 
(£) 
Transport  
Reduce your car usage by …miles per year  0.03t  
per/100 miles 
nothing 14  
p/100 miles 
Reduce your car fuel consumption by around 10% 
(eco-driving, no aircon, 60mph on m’way, etc.) 
(saving for average mileage) 
0.3t 
per/year 
nothing 125 
Buy a more fuel efficient car - (saving for average 
mileage) 
0.6t  
per/year 
depending on 
model 
250 
Reduce the number of domestic return flights (UK) 
by…per year  
0.15t  
per/return fight 
nothing price of ticket 
Reduce the number of short haul international return 
flights (Europe) by…per year 
0.3t  
per/return fight 
nothing price of ticket 
Reduce the number of long haul international 
(Intercontinental) return flights by…per year 
1.4t  
per/return fight 
nothing price of ticket 
Energy usage  
Turn your thermostat down by …degrees in winter –  
(saving per year per household) 
0.3t per/degree  
Celsius  
nothing 30/60 
Switch electrical equipment off at the socket to avoid 
“stand by” – (saving per year per household) 
0.2t 
per/year  
nothing 25/55 
Use washing machine for full loads only and dry 
hanging your clothes (no tumble dryer) – (saving per 
year per household) 
0.2t  
per/year 
nothing 25/55 
Turn off lighting when leaving rooms –  
(saving per year per household) 
0.04t 
per/year 
nothing 10/30 
Taking shorter showers 
 
0.15t 
per/year 
nothing 20/40 
Energy saving product/technology  
Install solid wall insulation - external and internal 
(saving per year per household) 
1.7t 
per/year 
 From 3,750  
(5 years)  
400/600 
Install floor insulation –  
(saving per year per household) 
0.3t 
per/year 
 From 150  
(2 yrs) 
30/60 
Install solar thermal water heating –  
(saving per year per household) 
0.3t 
per/year 
From 4000 30/60 
Install solar photovoltaic panels –  
(saving per household per year) 
1.0t 
per/year 
From 6,500 150/200 
Replace old boiler with more efficient one 
(condensing) – 
(saving per year per household) 
0.8t  
per/year 
From 2,000 75/125 
Install double glazing – 
(saving per year per household) 
0.7t  
per/year 
not available 70/110 
Install a ground source heat pump –  
(saving per year per household) 
2.0t  
per/year 
From 12,000 500/700 
Install a micro wind-turbine – 
(saving per year per household) 
0.6t  
per/year 
From 1,500 75/125 
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 Table A3. Behavioural question example for CT and PCT 
The carbon tax is £(5,10,25) per 0.10t of CO2 (£50,100 or 250 per tonne of CO2) and like everyone 
you receive a tax refund of £ (price multiplied by 4.0 tonnes) at the end of the year.  
 
Your total CO2 tax is Total multiplied by price above …….So, overall you would pay (per 
year): difference between total tax and tax refund (above)…
Please indicate below what you would do:  
(1) I would not reduce my carbon footprint and I would pay the carbon tax for 
the entire amount 
 
 
(2) I would reduce my carbon footprint and reduce the amount of tax I would 
pay 
 
 
The carbon tax is £(5,10,25) per 0.10t of CO2 (£50,100 or 250 per tonne of CO2) and everyone 
receives a tax refund of £ (price multiplied by 4.0 tonnes) at the end of the year.  
 
Your total CO2 tax is… Total  multiplied by price above ……..So, overall your surplus is (per 
year): ……difference between total tax and tax refund…………………
Please indicate below what you would do:  
(1) I would not reduce my carbon footprint and keep the surplus  
 
(2) I would reduce my carbon footprint and increase the surplus  
 
The extra permits you have may be sold at a price of £(5,10,25) per 0.10t of CO2 (£50,100 or 250 
per tonne of CO2) 
 
If you do not change your behaviour you could sell permits and receive (per year): Difference  
multiplied by price above 
Please indicate below what you would do: 
(1) I would not reduce my carbon footprint and I would sell the extra carbon 
permits for the entire amount 
 
 
(2) I would reduce my carbon footprint and sell more permits  
 
The price for carbon permits above the allowance is £(5,10,25) per 0.10t of CO2 (£50,100 or 250 per 
tonne of CO2)  
If you do not change your behaviour you would need to purchase permits and pay (per year): 
Difference multiplied by price above 
Please indicate below what you would do (question 1): 
(1) I would not reduce my carbon footprint and I would buy extra carbon permits 
for the entire amount 
 
 
(2) I would reduce my carbon footprint and reduce the amount of permits I would 
have to purchase 
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Table 1. Explanatory variables 
Variable Coding 
Male 1 if respondent is male, 0 if female 
Base 
Age1829 
Age3045 
Age4560 
Respondents more than 60 years old 
1 if respondent in the age band 18-29, 0 otherwise  
1 if respondent in the age band 30-45, 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent in the age band 45-60, 0 otherwise 
Hsldsize Respondent household size 
Car 1 if respondent uses a car, 0 otherwise 
Fly 1 if respondent flies, 0 otherwise 
Rent 1 if respondent live in rented accommodation, 0 otherwise 
Base 
Emp 
Educ 
Ret 
Unemployed respondents 
1 if respondent in full or part time employment, 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent in full or part time education, 0 otherwise   
1 if respondents in retirement, 0 otherwise 
Taxpct 1 if respondents faced TAX, 0 if PCT 
PriceT Total amount to be paid (or credited) for tax or extra permits 
PriceU Amount to be paid (credited) for tax or extra permits per Tonne of CO2 
Blwabv 1 if respondent’s initial carbon consumption was below 4.0 tonnes, 0 otherwise 
Totco2 Respondent’s initial carbon consumption 
Base 
Inc2550 
Inco>50 
NoInc 
Gross household income less than £25,000 
1 if gross household income between £25,000 and £50,000, 0 otherwise 
1 if gross household income more than £50,000, 0 otherwise 
1 if gross household income information missing, 0 otherwisea 
Lower  
Base  
Higher  
1 if carbon footprint was lower than expected, 0 otherwise 
No surprise 
1 if carbon footprint was higher than expected, 0 otherwise 
Base 
Chgmon 
Chgclima 
Chgother 
No current changes in behaviour 
1 if existing changes had monetary reasons, 0 otherwise 
1 if existing changes had environmental reasons, 0 otherwise 
1 if existing changes had other reasons, 0 otherwise 
Costb   Importance score of cost as a barrier to carbon saving actions 
Timeb    Importance score of time as a barrier to carbon saving actions 
Easyhome Perceived ability to reduce carbon emissions from home energy 
Easytran Perceived ability to reduce carbon emissions from transport 
aThis included 46 respondents (23% of sample) who answered “I do not know” or “Refused” to the income question. 
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Table 2. Would you reduce given the conditions of the schemes? Binary Logit – N=189 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 B-coeff T-value B-coeff T-value 
Constant 0.126 0.089 -1.896 -1.205 
Male     0.327 0.734 0.340 0.741 
Age1829  -0.369 -0.482 -0.166 -0.215 
Age3044  -1.216 -1.771* -1.112 -1.624 
Age4560  -0.993 -1.421 -0.928 -1.323 
Hsldsize 0.397 2.278** 0.406 2.313** 
Car  -1.607 -2.855*** -1.566 -2.762*** 
Fly  -0.430 -0.924 -0.526 -1.112 
Rent     -0.441 -0.868 -0.496 -0.956 
Emp      1.666 2.660*** 1.535 2.451** 
Educ    0.560 0.636 0.208 0.234 
Ret      0.858 1.175 0.770 1.055 
Taxpct 0.808 1.860* 0.883 2.004** 
PriceT 0.002 1.757*   
PriceU   0.011 2.489** 
Price T/U x Blwabv -0.004 -1.644* -0.010 -1.647* 
Blwabv -0.459 -0.655 0.431 0.461 
Totco2  -0.122 -1.197 0.044 0.585 
Inc2550 -0.326 -0.506 -0.237 -0.367 
Inc>50 -2.266 -2.537** -2.067 -2.242** 
NoInc -1.031 -1.830* -0.955 -1.665* 
Lower   0.109 0.190 -0.031 -0.053 
Higher  0.877 1.597 0.915 1.647* 
Chgmoney 0.930 1.287 1.172 1.548 
Chgclima 2.091 2.652*** 2.253 2.749*** 
Chgother 1.234 1.559 1.372 1.670* 
Costb   0.337 1.907* 0.320 1.776* 
Timeb    -0.433 -1.985** -0.382 -1.744* 
Easyhome 0.070 0.315 0.062 0.278 
Easytran 0.254 1.274 0.242 1.194 
LogLikelihood -78.422 -77.030 
McFadden R2 0.260 0.273 
* Significant at 90% level - ** 95% level - *** 99% level 
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Table 3. Average savings per person and composition – tonnes of CO2 (% with respect to 
initial relevant carbon footprint) N=189 (101 CT – 88 PCT) 
Variable Scheme 
 CT PCT 
Initial average carbon footprint  5.62 5.49 
Reductions for respondents who saved   
Transport 0.27 (9.8)a 0.60 (15.1)a 
Domestic energy 0.47 (15.3) 0.58 (19.3) 
Overall 0.69 (13.9) 1.04 (18.6) 
Reduction for all sample   
Transport 0.22 (7.7)a 0.45 (11.4)a 
Domestic energy 0.37 (12.0) 0.42 (13.8) 
Overall  0.54 (10.9) 0.75 (13.3) 
Average new carbon footprint (all respondents) 5.08 4.75 
aThese averages only include respondents who had transport emissions. 
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Table 4. How much would you reduce? CO2 savings – GLS - N=142 
Variable Model 3 Model 4 
 B-coeff T-value B-coeff T-value 
Constant 0.092 0.947 0.142 1.355 
Male     0.002 0.069 0.003 0.104 
Age1829  -0.052 -1.239 -0.051 -1.193 
Age3044  -0.044 -1.090 -0.046 -1.146 
Age4560  -0.022 -0.632 -0.020 -0.548 
Hsldsize -0.017 -1.686* -0.015 -1.518 
Car  0.050 1.568 0.045 1.417 
Fly  0.022 0.875 0.023 0.891 
Rent     -0.050 -1.648* -0.051 -1.641* 
Emp      -0.029 -0.747 -0.018 -0.468 
Educ    0.124 2.263** 0.133 2.405** 
Ret      -0.023 -0.516 -0.016 -0.367 
Taxpct -0.058 -2.172** -0.059 -2.173** 
PriceT -0.2x10-4 -0.959  
PriceU   -0.2x10-3 -1.040 
Price T or U x Blwabv 0.2x10-3 2.224** 0.2x10-3 1.172 
Blwabv -0.024 -0.564 -0.034 -0.594 
Totco2  0.001 0.150 -0.004 -0.847 
Inc2550 0.001 0.038 -0.009 -0.268 
Inc>50 0.096 1.637 0.078 1.321 
NoInc 0.081 2.307** 0.078 2.155** 
Lower   0.077 1.912* 0.081 1.991** 
Higher  0.033 1.053 0.029 0.916 
Chgmoney 0.080 1.527 0.069 1.278 
Chgclima 0.122 2.207** 0.113 1.985** 
Chgother 0.041 0.732 0.035 0.606 
Costb   0.001 0.061 0.001 0.111 
Timeb    0.011 0.877 0.010 0.760 
Easyhome 0.028 1.998** 0.027 1.858* 
Easytran 0.016 1.425 0.017 1.499 
R2 0.289 0.272 
Chi2 80.82(28)*** 77.48(28)*** 
* Significant at 90% level - ** 95% level - *** 99% level.  
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Figure 1: Partial effects of interaction term for above (ABV) and below (BLW) allocation 
respondents – PriceT 
 
Figure 2: Partial effects of interaction term for above (ABV) and below (BLW) allocation 
respondents – PriceU 
 
Figure 3: Partial effects of interaction term for Tax and Pct – PriceT 
 
Figure 4: Partial effects of interaction term for Tax and Pct – PriceU 
